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Chapter 1 
Beyond disintegration: political and institutional 









The European Union is facing one of the most dramatic crises of its long 
history. The present EU crisis has many dimensions, some of which are 
clearly and directly related to the social dimension of Europe: the issue 
of migrants (Hassel and Wagener, this volume), the enduring weakness 
of our labour markets as a consequence of the still slow economic 
recovery (Bouget and Vanhercke, this volume), and last but not least the 
increasing divergence of labour and social standards between the 
different parts of the EU. All these tensions are putting European 
integration at risk. While other chapters in this volume address the 
many social dimensions of the crisis, the present contribution outlines 
the main institutional and political problems in the EU, and envisages 
some possible solutions. 
 
This chapter raises the following questions: first, Why have the 
Eurozone (or Economic and Monetary Union, EMU) and the European 
Union (EU) been weakened by the Euro crisis and the ensuing refugee 
and terrorist crises, opening a process of disintegration after 60 years 
of uninterrupted, although contrasted (Dinan 2006), integration? In 
particular, disintegration has become a reality (Lefkofridi and Schmitter 
2014), first with the outcome of the British referendum of 23 June 
2016, when a majority of United Kingdom citizens voted to take their 
country out of the EU (so-called Brexit1). Second, Greece’s ongoing 
difficulty in fulfilling its financial obligations (i.e. respecting the 
conditions imposed on the country by its donors) has kept alive the 
                                                                
 
1.  Brexit is an abbreviation of ‘British exit’. 
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option of forcing Greece out of the Eurozone (the so-called Grexit2, see 
Theodoropoulou, this volume). The second question this chapter tackles 
is therefore: How could the process of disintegration be dealt with by 
the EMU and the EU? 
 
To answer the first question, this chapter recalls the structure of inter-
state compromises struck within the EU and EMU, which shaped the 
decision-making process for dealing with the economic policy side of 
EMU but also applied to, say, security and asylum policies. Certainly, 
the financial crisis has been of an unprecedented magnitude, but its 
impact on the EU and EMU has been amplified by the weakness of the 
decision-making structure set up – from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty – to deal with the economic governance of the 
single currency. That decision-making structure has clear intergovern-
mental features. The intergovernmental response to the Euro crisis 
(and to the other crises as well) has thus contributed to a deepening of 
the divisions, within the EU and EMU, between groups and sections of 
Member States (North vs. South, West vs. East) with regard to the 
policies to be pursued. Because these policies were of great significance 
to national domestic actors, they were assigned to the coordinated 
control of national governments. However, in crisis conditions, 
intergovernmental coordination has not worked as expected, triggering 
centrifugal forces within the EU and EMU. Regarding the second 
question, the chapter considers two strategies for dealing with these 
centrifugal pressures: strengthening policy differentiation within the 
same legal and institutional order, or pursuing an alternative strategy of 
constitutional differentiation between distinct institutional and legal 
orders.  
 
The chapter will be organized as follows: section 1 describes the model 
of economic governance of the Eurozone. Section 2 analyses the impact 
of the Euro crisis on that model. Section 3 discusses the features of the 
two differentiation strategies. The final section sums up and draws the 
main conclusions from the analysis. 
 
 
                                                                
 
2. Grexit is a portmanteau combining the English words ‘Greek’ and ‘exit’. 
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1. Intergovernmental economic governance 
 
The centrifugal pressures which have developed within the EU and 
EMU (Fossum and Ménendez 2014) cannot be understood without 
considering the decision-making structure set up through and by the 
Lisbon Treaty for dealing with the economic side of EMU, migration 
and refugee policies, and home security policies3. The logic of that 
decision-making structure is mainly intergovernmental. Indeed, since 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, policies which were politically salient for 
domestic actors have entered the EU agenda, on the proviso that 
national governments could control them. In Maastricht, a Pillar 
structure was introduced to distinguish between the regulatory policies 
of the single market to be managed by the traditional Community 
method (Dehousse 2011), and the Common Foreign and Security Policies 
(CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues, to be controlled by 
national governments through their intergovernmental institutions4. 
The Europeanisation of policies traditionally close to core state powers 
(Genschell and Jacthenfuchs 2014), and their management through the 
intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers (then only Council) (Puetter 2014), have dramatically 
increased the impact of domestic politics on EU decision-making and 
vice versa.  
 
The intergovernmental union which emerged to manage the new 
policies, in our case the economic side of EMU, is the outcome of inter-
state compromises. The decision to introduce a single currency (taken 
during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) held in Maastricht in 
1991), was a turning point in the process of European integration. That 
decision was contained within a structure of compromises that made it 
possible, firstly, for a few Member States to opt out of the new single 
                                                                
 
3. On the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, see Craig (2010) and 
Piris (2010). 
4. The Community method (adopted for the regulatory policies of the single market) implies that 
the decision-making power has to be shared between supranational institutions (the European 
Commission – with its monopoly on legislative initiative – and the European Parliament as a 
true co-decisional legislature) and the intergovernmental institutions (mainly represented by 
the Council of Ministers or Council, the other co-decisional legislature). The Intergovernmental 
method (adopted for the new policies) implies that the decision-making power is held by the 
European Council (constituted by the Heads of State and Government) and the Council of 
Ministers, with the supranational institutions of the Commission and the European Parliament 
playing a subordinate role. 
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currency regime; and, second, to establish within the EMU an 
intergovernmental arrangement for the control of economic policy and 
a supranational system for the control of monetary policy. Regarding 
the first compromise, the EU has thus developed as an internally 
differentiated political system (Leuffen et al. 2013; Dyson and Sepos 
2010), with the aim of accommodating Member States assumed to be 
pursuing the same finality of the integration process but at different 
speeds (Piris 2012).  
 
By means of the second Maastricht compromise, a Eurozone was 
created, organized according to a decision-making model combining 
centralization of monetary policy and decentralization of economic, 
financial, fiscal and social policies (Issing 2008). The monetary policy 
of the common currency was put under the control of an independent 
federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), but the other 
connected policies remained in the hands of Member State govern-
ments. These decentralized policies, however, were to be coordinated 
within and by the intergovernmental institutions of the European 
Council and the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council. 
These policies were ‘Europeanized’, but managed by national govern-
ments working in collegiate bodies – as represented by the Council and 
the European Council – with limited involvement of the supranational 
institutions of the European Commission and European Parliament. 
With regard to these decentralized policies, it was also established that 
integration would have to proceed through political, rather than legal, 
acts. Since integration could not take place through law in these 
policies, the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
– whose power has continued to be crucial in the supranational 
constitution – would be curtailed. Since Maastricht, more integration 
does therefore not necessarily imply more supra-nationalization 
(Fabbrini and Puetter 2016).  
 
This Maastricht compromise was further institutionalized in and 
through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Heipertz and Verdun 
2010), made up of a Resolution of June 1997, two Council Regulations 
of July 1997 and finally the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP), also approved in July 1997. The first Regulation ‘on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies’ – known as the 
preventive arm of the SGP – entered into force on 1 July 1998; the 
Beyond disintegration: political and institutional prospects of the EU 
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second Regulation ‘on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure’ – known as the SGP’s corrective arm – 
entered into force on 1 January 1999. Although this compromise 
allowed Member States to pursue their own policies, they had to do so 
within macro-economic parameters (setting out the ratio of public 
deficit and debt to GDP), formalized as proper statutory rules. The 
principle of voluntary coordination between national governments was 
thus established, but that voluntary coordination had to be regulated by 
macro-economic rules, and only the national governments could 
determine (as a collective in the ECOFIN Council) whether or not those 
rules had been respected by one of their number. No legal requirements 
were imposed on the behaviour of national governments by any of the 
supranational institutions (the European Commission in particular). 
The Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar-structure that had been 
established in the Maastricht Treaty, but it kept the intergovernmental 
decision-making regime for the economic policy of the Eurozone 
(Dyson and Quaglia 2010) and the other new policies. In other words: 
when the financial crisis struck Europe, not only was there an 
intergovernmental regime in place to deal with it, but there was also a 
general consensus between national governments that they alone 
should find solutions for the financial turmoil.  
 
With the Lisbon Treaty, it was thought that a single currency area might 
consolidate and develop without a single public authority managing the 
economic, financial and fiscal policies connected to the single currency. 
Moreover, the ECB was strictly constrained – by its statute – to adopt 
only anti-inflationary measures and not measures connected to growth 
and employment (as is the case with the US Federal Reserve). An 
informal Eurogroup of economic and financial ministers of the 
Eurozone was given the task of coordinating distinct national economic 
policies. If the ECB is understood as a technocratic institution, then the 
EMU consisted of one single currency managed by a plurality of 
governments, although coordinated through the intergovernmental 
institutions of the European Council and the Council of the EU. It was 
in fact the collective of the national governments belonging to the EMU 
that had been given, by the Lisbon Treaty, the role of governing the 
single currency. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty it was generally 
thought that the above inter-state compromises would finally be 
consolidated (Kral 2008). 
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2.  The crisis of the EMU economic governance model 
 
The 2008 financial crisis upset the fundamental compromises 
underpinning the Lisbon Treaty (Fabbrini 2014). First, it upset the 
compromise between the UK (and more in general the ex-EFTA area5) 
and the EMU Member States. Two new intergovernmental Treaties 
entered into force in January 2013: the 2012 European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, also referred to as 
the Fiscal Compact. Both Treaties were established outside the legal 
order of the Lisbon Treaty to deal with the financial crisis: the former as 
a firewall for managing it, the latter as an instrument to prevent 
another crisis. The Eurozone leaders chose to resort to international 
treaties to neutralize the veto threatened by the UK government. In 
order to prevent future veto threats, these treaties set up new 
organizations where unanimity is no longer needed for decision taking. 
The Fiscal Compact even established (Title VI, Art. 14.2) that, to enter 
into force, it requires the approval of only 12 out of the then 17 (now 19) 
Eurozone signatory Member States (out of the then 25 Member States 
of the EU).  
 
Moreover, the European Commission’s intervention vis-à-vis any 
contracting party that disrespects the agreement is now quasi-
automatic, an automaticity that can be prevented only by a reversed 
qualified majority of the finance ministers of the signatory Member 
States (Fiscal Compact, Art. 17). Furthermore, the Fiscal Compact 
requires the contracting parties to introduce the balanced-budget rule 
at constitutional level (or equivalent), thus also limiting from within the 
domestic system the possibilities for non-compliance and policy 
discretion. As a result of the Fiscal Compact, the vast majority of 
Member States are now coordinating their economic, fiscal and 
budgetary policies, leaving out only the UK; the Czech Republic, which 
refused to sign the Treaty in 2011, eventually signed it in March 2014. 
                                                                
 
5. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was constituted in 1960 as an alternative 
project to that inaugurated by the 1957 Rome Treaty (European Economic Community, later 
EU). Originally, its members were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK. Iceland entered the organization in 1970, Finland in 1986 and Lichtenstein in 
1991. Several of these countries left EFTA to then join the EU. Currently, only Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are members of EFTA. 
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Moreover, the UK did not sign the 2011 Euro Plus Pact, a political 
commitment (intergovernmental agreement) between the Eurozone 
Member States and several others (such as Denmark, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia and Lithuania6) aimed at fostering stronger economic 
policy coordination between them. The new organization set up by the 
Fiscal Compact has revealed the differing interests between the 
Eurozone and the opt-out Member States. The most crucial decisions 
have been taken in the meetings of the governmental leaders of the 
Member States adopting the Euro (‘Euro Summit’), with the pre-‘ins’ 
and the ‘out’ Member States frequently being informed later about their 
content (Ludlow 2011).  
 
The compromise between a centralized monetary policy and nationalized 
economic policies has also suffered in the course of the Euro crisis. 
Constrained by the intergovernmental constitutional arrangements, the 
voluntary coordination of national policies has been unrelentingly 
challenged by its internal dilemmas. The response to these difficulties 
has been a further regulatory centralization of the governance of the 
Eurozone, through the establishment of stricter macro-economic and 
budgetary rules to be respected by the signatory states, in line with the 
ordo-liberal economic tradition developed in the 1930s by the Freiburg 
School (Young 2012). Financial aid to Member States unable to respect 
the requirements has been accompanied by conditionality rules that 
have led to the reduction of their decision-making autonomy. National 
discretion has been unevenly restructured, with the debtor Member 
States becoming less autonomous than the creditor Member States 
because of their inability to control the externalities of their policies.  
 
The net outcome of this process, however, has been an across-the-board 
restructuring of national welfare systems, which has taken the form of a 
significant down-sizing of social protection programmes in the indebted 
Member States (Ferrera 2014). Within the European Council and the 
Euro Summit, a decision-making hierarchy has emerged in the form of 
a German-French (and then only German) directoire of the Union’s 
financial policy. Within the European Council, the financial strategy for 
dealing with the crisis came to be decided more and more by Berlin and 
                                                                
 
6. Latvia subsequently entered the Eurozone on 1 January 2014, and Lithuania on 1 January 2015. 
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its Northern allies, and was then approved by the intergovernmental 
institution as such (Fabbrini 2013). The growing German unilateral 
leadership of the European Council has coincided with an unprece-
dented split between Northern and Southern Member States within the 
Eurozone. Instead of giving the Eurozone an autonomous budget and 
legitimate political authority to deal with the crisis, the outcome has 
been a convoluted imposition of rules on the policies to be pursued 
within EMU.  
 
Thus, throughout the Euro crisis, the intergovernmental regime has 
gradually come to prevail over the supranational arrangements: the 
latter one still applicable, through the Community method, to the 
decision-making process in the regulatory policies of the single market. 
Not only has the European Council become the decision-making centre 
for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, but the Euro 
Summit of the heads of state and government of the Eurozone 
(formalized by the Fiscal Compact) has also become a driving 
institution for framing the responses to the crisis (Fabbrini 2015a; 
Puetter 2014). Given the structure of economic governance set up in the 
Treaty, the European Commission was asked to play a largely 
administrative role, transforming the policy guidance of the European 
Council into technical proposals. Indeed, when the European 
Commission claimed a more political role in interpreting the rules, the 
heads of government of the creditor Member States reacted by 
threatening to exclude it from any decision-making arena. The more the 
crisis has deepened, the more the European Council has established its 
executive role. This has not meant that the European Commission has 
become unimportant. Indeed, the legislative measures (the 2010 
European Semester, the 2011 ‘Six-pack’, the 2013 ‘Two-pack’) and 
intergovernmental treaties introduced during the crisis have increased 
the technocratic role of the European Commission in monitoring 
Member States’ behaviour regarding their respect and enforcement of 
intergovernmental decisions (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2015).  
 
At the same time, the European Parliament has been left in a sort of 
institutional limbo. More precisely, it has been marginalized in the 
decision-making process. It is true that a few legislative measures were 
adopted through either ordinary or special legislative procedures (that 
recognize a decision-making or consultative role for the EP), but these 
legislative acts do not assign an active role to the EP in economic policy. 
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Moreover, the deepening of the Euro crisis has led to new treaties that 
do not recognize the EP as a policy-making actor. Certainly, it is 
difficult to identify a role for the EP (which represents the citizens of the 
EU) in new organizations set up by not all of the Member States of the 
EU (Hefftler and Wessels 2013). With the Euro crisis, the decision-
making barycentre of economic policy has moved towards the 
relationship between the European Council (along with the Euro 
Summit) and the ECOFIN Council (along with the Eurogroup of the 
economic and financial ministers of the Eurozone Member States), 
rather than towards the relationship between the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EP (which has continued 
to be predominant in single market policies). 
 
In sum, the Euro crisis has introduced significant changes to the 
institutional context of the Maastricht-Lisbon compromises: it has 
increased the policy and institutional distance between the Eurozone 
and the non-Eurozone Member States of the EU; it has shown the 
incongruence of managing a common currency through a plurality of 
decentralized economic policies, although coordinated through the 
Euro Summit and the Eurogroup; it has weakened the supranational 
logic of the EU through the central role acquired by intergovernmental 
policies in the EU agenda. Politics have been replaced by macro-
economic and technical rules, decided by national governments because 
of their mutual distrust, and the question of whether or not these rules 
have been respected has been interpreted in purely technocratic terms. 
When the need for politics emerged, it took the form of German 
leadership of the EMU. Indeed, in a crisis situation, intergovern-
mentalism has led to the formation of hierarchical decision-making 
patterns within the EMU. 
 
 
3.  What sort of differentiation to deal with 
centrifugal pressures? 
 
The Euro crisis has not been business as usual, nor can the refugee 
crisis and the terrorist threat be considered to be business as usual. In 
particular, the Euro crisis has altered the basic inter-state compromises 
underpinning the EMU and the EU. The Euro crisis has shown that the 
coexistence of different monetary regimes within the EU has become 
increasingly untenable. The purely economic perspective of the opt-out 
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Member States has ended up contrasting with the Eurozone’s need for 
‘a more genuine economic and monetary union’ in order to manage 
current and prevent future financial crises (see the Four Presidents’ 
Report, van Rompuy et al. 2012, and the Five Presidents’ Report, 
Juncker et al. 2015). The Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States 
are already separate, both institutionally and legally. Brexit magnified 
this separation. The EMU has created an institutional setting structured 
around the Euro Summit and the Eurogroup, and a discussion has 
started within the EP on how to distinguish, in deliberations concerning 
EMU policies, between members of the European Parliament or MEPs 
elected in Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States. At the same 
time, the Fiscal Compact and the other intergovernmental treaties have 
created a new legal order for the Eurozone, although this is divided 
internally and overlaps with the legal order of the Lisbon Treaty. In this 
new context, Brexit has led the EU to a crossroads: a choice between 
deepening policy differentiation between clusters of Member States in 
the hope of keeping them within the same legal order, or building a 
constitutional differentiation between the Eurozone and the non-
Eurozone Member States, thus connecting them within the single 
market framework.7  
 
 
3.1 Policy differentiation 
 
Policy differentiation is a political strategy aimed at reconstructing the 
unitary order of the Lisbon Treaty, albeit internally differentiated on 
the basis of the measures introduced to manage the Euro crisis. As 
stated by Leuffen (2013: 5), ‘differentiated integration (is) a political 
program’. As discussed above, from Maastricht to Lisbon the EU 
already developed as an internally differentiated organization. The 
action of the EP during the drafting of the Fiscal Compact, aimed at 
establishing a clear formal deadline for bringing it back into the Lisbon 
                                                                
 
7. The literature on European integration is now proposing different strategies to respond to 
what we call here the Euro crisis. While this chapter looks at differentiation within the EU, 
with a core group of countries involved in more intense integration, some analysts have 
proposed a process of differentiation based on weaker cooperation (see Zielonka 2014; 
Majone 2014), while others have focused on the need to change the economic and monetary 
policy of the EU (see De Grauwe 2016; McDonnell 2012) or on the need to change the logic of 
the EU political debate in a more ‘cosmopolitan’ sense (Borzel 2016). None of these strands 
presuppose any Treaty revisions. 
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Treaty (European Parliament 2012; Kreilinger 2012), is an expression 
of that programme. The nomination on 30 August 2014 of Donald Tusk, 
a former Prime Minister of a non-Eurozone Member State (Poland), as 
president of both the European Council and the Euro Summit, is 
another example of the attempt to reduce the divisive effects of the Euro 
crisis.  
 
Brexit has been used by several Member States – the ‘Visegrad Group’, 
made up of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – to call 
for a sort of nullification of those EU decisions that might affect the 
electoral fortunes of national governments, such as the reallocation of 
refugee quotas from such countries as Italy or Greece to the other 
Member States. Indeed, Brexit has also been used to demand the 
repatriation of competences in policy areas (such as international trade) 
assigned – by all the treaties, from the 1957 Rome Treaties to the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty – to the exclusive competence of the EU institutions. The 
European Council’s declarations that the much maligned ‘ever closer 
union’ clause does not apply to this or that Member State, will loom 
large on the horizon. Especially if that Member State has resorted to a 
popular referendum to legitimize its claim, as happened in Hungary 
with regard to refugee policy. At the same time, to prevent the 
possibility of another Grexit and the complete wearing down of 
peripheral Eurozone Member States by austerity policies, more 
flexibility will be allowed in the interpretation of the rules on the 
functioning of Eurozone governance and the ECB. Under this strategy, 
one can imagine an EU made up of different clusters of Member States, 
participating permanently in different policy regimes with varying 
degrees of integration, and with many grey areas between these regimes 
(a theoretical discussion on the EU as ‘a club of clubs’ can be found in 
Majone 2014). Policy differentiation thus acknowledges the differences 
between Member States (and their domestic politics), although it 
continues to assume that these differences are compatible with a 
unitary process of integration and legal framework (Blockmans 2014; 
Schmidt 2010). 
 
This political programme of policy differentiation has, however, its 
weaknesses. The conflict of interests between the non-Eurozone and the 
Eurozone Member States could not be easily kept within a unitary legal 
order. The need for deeper integration in EMU policies would put a 
tremendous strain on the common legal and institutional order; any 
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step towards more integration within the legal framework of the Lisbon 
Treaty would certainly trigger an exasperated reaction against the EU in 
the non-Eurozone Member States. It seems unlikely that disintegration 
could be prevented through diplomatic agreements regarding the 
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty, once the centrifugal forces of 
repatriation of policy competences have left the Pandora’s box. At the 
same time, differentiated integration would not alter the intergovern-
mental logic of the EMU (for refugee or security policies), the decisions 
of which have lacked the necessary democratic legitimacy to be 
accepted by the citizens affected in the Southern Eurozone Member 
States. The dissatisfaction with the management of financial policy in 
the latter Member States cannot be silenced by confirmation of its 
intergovernmental origins. Bringing national parliaments into the 
differentiated regime of EMU economic governance (Glencross 2014) 
would not solve the structural legitimacy deficit of the intergovern-
mental method, but would certainly increase its structural inefficiency. 
More in general, the involvement of national parliaments in EU policies 
might indeed be a way to obstruct decisions taken by the EU institutions. 
One has only to think of the choice made in July 2016 by the Council 
and the European Commission, to let (38) national legislative chambers 
vote on the trade agreement between the EU and Canada (the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA) concluded on 
December 2015. A choice that will certainly hold up approval of a policy 
that, however, pertains exclusively to EU competences8.  
 
Legitimacy for decisions taken at the supranational level should come 
from supranational institutions, in our case the EP. However, not only 
has the EP been excluded from the main EMU decisions, but its 
inclusion is constitutionally questionable. Because the EP ‘shall be 
composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens’ (TEU, Art. 14.2), 
not of representatives of Member State citizens, it would be 
controversial to distinguish – in its internal deliberative process – 
between representatives coming from Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
Member States, allowing only the latter to have a say on the decisions 
taken by Eurozone institutions (Euro Summit and Eurogroup). 
                                                                
 
8. Indeed, the contrary vote to the CETA by the parliament of Wallonia on mid-October 2016 
has constrained the Belgian vote in favor of the Agreement, jeopardizing the conclusion of 
the agreement between the EU and Canada. 
Beyond disintegration: political and institutional prospects of the EU 
 .................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2016 25 
Efficiency, in its turn, requires a supranational authority with the power 
and the resources to take decisions. Finally, a differentiated EU would 
leave the technocratic (ordo-liberal) order of EMU intact, with its 
institutionalized bias in favour of the economic interests and cultural 
values of the Northern and creditor Eurozone Member States. 
 
 
3.2 Constitutional differentiation  
 
Constitutional differentiation is a strategy aimed at building a 
pluralistic institutional order in Europe primarily based on the 
constitutional differentiation between the Eurozone and the other EU 
Member States. This strategy would require a political decision by the 
Eurozone political leaders in order to prevent centrifugal pressures both 
in the EMU and EU. This requires a double and contextual constitutional 
act to set up a Euro-political union and to revise the single market 
union of the Lisbon Treaty. For the Eurozone, a model of economic 
governance would need to be found which was capable of dealing with 
the structural transformation caused by the Euro crisis. The Euro-
political union would necessarily be based on a constitutional pact with 
the features of a basic ‘Political Compact’ (Lamond 2013), specifying 
(a) the political (not cultural) values and aims of the Euro-political 
union, (b) the policy competences and fiscal resources allocated to the 
supranational and national levels of the Euro-political union, (c) the 
separation of powers to manage the supranational policies of the Euro-
political union, and (d) the power of the judiciary in protecting citizens’ 
rights and Member States’ prerogatives within the Euro-political union. 
The Lisbon Treaty might continue to provide the legal basis for the 
single market, although shorn of those parts concerned with the policies 
unrelated to the functioning of the market: EMU and the two Maastricht 
intergovernmental pillars, i.e. monetary, financial, economic, fiscal, 
budgetary, foreign, security, defense, home and justice affairs, inter 
alia. In doing so, it might be possible to revise also certain unnecessary 
regulatory constraints on specific issues, without however calling into 
question the role of the supranational institutions – such as the CJEU 
and the European Commission – that make a single market possible. 
 
The economic governance model of the Euro-political union should include 
the creation of a specific fiscal capacity to be used by a legitimate executive 
power operating under the scrutiny of an independent legislative power. 
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That fiscal capacity should derive from sources independent of the Euro-
political union, such as a tax on financial transactions. Inter-state transfers 
of financial resources should be minimized, or used only in exceptional 
circumstances, since they foster resentment in both those giving and those 
receiving these resources. The existence of an independent budget for the 
Euro-political union could make up for the no-bail out clause, already set 
out in Art. 125 of the Lisbon Treaty. The lack of an EMU budget made it 
impossible to respect the no-bail out clause in the Greek case. Indeed, 
Greece originally had to be saved, partly because the creditors of Greek 
debt were German and French banks and international financial 
institutions. At the same time, Greece has used the EMU’s fear of its 
financial collapse to pursue a reverse blackmail strategy, demanding 
solidarity with no strict conditional strings attached. In constitutional 
federal unions, debt is a national responsibility, whereas growth and 
employment is a matter for the union. 
 
While the Euro-political union should have its own constitutional bases 
(in order to contain centrifugal processes between its members) and its 
own policy responsibilities, at the same time the institutional structure 
of the Euro-political union should be adequate to deal with its systemic 
properties, i.e. the demographic asymmetry of its Member States and 
the different national identities. The Euro-political union should be 
structured around a formal separation between legislative and executive 
institutions and functions. Indeed, the Euro crisis has shown that the 
executive power of the Euro Summit is largely unaccountable to the EP 
(Crum 2013). Separation of powers implies a multilateral institutional 
system for balancing asymmetrical inter-state and differentiated inter-
citizens relations (Fabbrini 2015b). In a system with separation of 
powers, none of the institutions participating in the decision-making 
process requires the confidence of others before acting, but none can 
impose its decisions without the consent of the others. A new 
institutional architecture would therefore be required for the Euro-
political union, whereby a public authority can take decisions on economic 
policy on the basis of democratic legitimacy. The Euro-political union 
should function according to a model of compound democracy 
(Fabbrini 2010), with a political logic based on checks and balances 
between horizontally and vertically separate institutions. 
 
The distinct institutional and legal orders should thus find robust 
bridges to connect with each other in internal market policies. The 
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modalities for the functioning of a single market including the Member 
States of the Euro-political union together with other European states 
would need to be specified. The single market, not the Euro-political 
union, might be open to European states currently outside of the EU 
(such as Norway, some Balkan states, or at some point the UK) or semi-
European states (such as Turkey or other countries at the fringe of 
Europe), provided that they met precise macro-economic and micro-
institutional conditions and that a geopolitical equilibrium was respected. 
In sum, it would be necessary, firstly, to separate Member States 
interested only in economic cooperation (the non-Eurozone Member 
States) from the Member States pressurised or willing to move in the 
direction of a political union (the Eurozone Member States). Secondly, 
they would need to be connected through a flexible agreement aimed at 
preserving and regulating the policies of the internal market in which 





This chapter has argued that the centrifugal pressures which have 
developed within the EU (epitomized by the prospect of Brexit) and 
within the EMU (epitomized by the possibility of Grexit) are the 
outcome of a combination of dramatic external shocks (the multiple 
crises) and inadequate institutional structures for dealing with these. 
These institutional structures were the outcome of a long and contrasted 
process of compromises between the Member States of the EU and 
EMU. The crises have radically altered the functioning of these structures, 
magnifying the divisions between Member States and preventing 
effective and legitimate responses to the external shocks. The Euro 
crisis in particular has been a litmus test for the resilience of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s attempt to keep the divisions between Member States within a 
unitary legal process. The Lisbon Treaty has failed this test, showing the 
unbridgeable divisions between the EU Member States. A debate has 
thus been opened on how to neutralize the disintegrative pressures and 
to create a new political order in Europe. 
 
The chapter has identified two alternative strategies for dealing with 
disintegration: policy differentiation and constitutional differentiation. 
Because of the radical differences between Member State perspectives 
on and interests in the EU, policy differentiation within a unitary legal 
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and institutional order would not seem to be an effective antidote to 
disintegration. A Europe à la carte would increase, not decrease, dis-
integration. This chapter has thus put forward the idea of an integrated 
Europe with a pluralism of institutional and legal arrangements, 
organisationally distinct and at the same time connected (see also 
Natali, this volume). The constitutional differentiation approach 
implies a process of managed integration and disintegration. A Euro-
political union would emerge from a decision in favor of deeper 
integration, whereas the single market would require the relaxation of 
unnecessary regulations (disintegration). The ‘ever closer union’ clause 
would apply to the Euro-political union, not the organization of the 
single market. At the same time, the Euro-political union would be less 
centralized than the current Eurozone. Constitutional firewalls should 
be introduced between the Member State level and the union level, 
defining the policy competences to be dealt with at either level. A clear 
separation of competences and institutions between the national and 
the union levels (the constitutional firewall) would be necessary to 
prevent a cough in a national capital becoming bronchitis in Brussels. 
Vertical mergers between levels of government, as well as horizontal 
confusion between governmental institutions at union level, should be 
prevented. National democracy would be preserved with regard to 
domestic policies, the powers of the union (although limited) would be 
strengthened with regard to collective policies. The Europe emerging 
from the multiple crises will continue to be integrated if its political 
elites and citizens recognize the need to begin an original and creative 
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